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A New Application of an Old Tort:
Intentional Inflection of Mental
Distress Against Physicians and
Hospitals
[Tihere are two valid policies fighting for recognition; the interest
in a judicial climate which does not become burdened with trivial
lawsuits versus the interest a person has in being free fxom unrea-
sonable emotional disturbance. The result of this policy conflict
has been somewhat of a compromise. The law has developed to
the extent that the personal interest in peace of mind is protected
from 'outrageous' interference which results in substantial emo-
tional damage, and at the same time the policy of protecting the
judicial process from trivial claims has been protected by disal-
lowing claims which are not founded on conduct which can be
characterized as 'outrageous.' . . . This approach gives limited
protection to the interest in emotional tranquility.'
I. Introduction
Mrs. Smith conceived a child although Dr. Jones adamantly
warned her of the probabilities that a child would be deformed be-
cause of Mrs. Smith's poor health. Mr. Smith, present in the delivery
room, watched Dr. Jones deliver a grossly deformed stillborn fetus.
Dr. Jones became so enraged at the disfigurement that he held the
child up before Mrs. Smith and yelled, "You had no right bearing a
child. What if this thing had lived!" Although he did not know that
his wife was asleep and, therefore, unaware of the doctor's affront,
Mr. Smith suffered severe emotional distress.
If a common carrier, an insurance adjuster or a neighbor exhib-
ited the abusive conduct, Mr. Smith would have little difficulty re-
covering for his emotional anguish under the independent tort
commonly referred to as the intentional infliction of mental distress,
IIMD,2 or outrageous conduct.3 The law has gradually recognized
I. Medlin v. Allied Investment Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 479, 398 S.W.2d 270, 274-75 (1966).
2. Although the abbreviation IIMD stands for the intentional infliction of mental dis-
tress, the shortened form of the tort includes reckless infliction of mental distress.
3. The trend in the United States is the protection of the legal right of emotional tran-
quility. The judicial policy generally favors the plaintiff in IIMD actions, but in actions
against physicians and hospitals, the policy favors the defendant. See notes 80-84 and accom-
panying text infra.
that emotional tranquility is a right worthy of legal protection.4
While the law denies protection against trivial emotional distress,5 it
will protect peace of mind from outrageous and intentional or reck-
less intrusions.6
Because the actor in the preceding hypothetical is a health care
provider, Mr. Smith confronts the probability of a preliminary dis-
missal of the complaint. Such drastic judicial action can be ex-
plained by the restrictive policy of courts to limit the liability of
physicians and hospitals,7 which may be effectuated in two ways. If
the plaintiff explicitly alleges intentional or reckless conduct, the
court may summarily decide that the alleged facts do not support the
legal conclusion.8 If the plaintiff brings a malpractice action against
the doctor, the court will equate the charge with simple negligence
without regard to intent or recklessness and thus deny recovery for
IIMD.9
The ensuing discussion explores the application of IIMD to the
medical field and analyzes the breadth of liability of physicians and
hospitals for conduct that causes another person, such as Mr. Smith,
to suffer severe emotional distress. The focus lies primarily with sit-
uations in which the plaintiff experiences emotional distress from
witnessing defendant's intentional or reckless and outrageous con-
duct directed at a third party.
II. Emergence of the Independent Tort of IIMD
In the landmark case Wilkinson v. Dowton, " decided in 1897,
the Queen's Bench overturned the law denying recovery solely for
4. Leibson, Recovery of Damagesfor Emotional Distress Caused by Injury to Another, 15
J. FAM. L. 163, 164 (1976).
5. In 1936 Professor Calvert Magruder advocated the adoption of an independent tort
for the recovery of emotional distress intentionally and outrageously inflicted. Noting the
need for limitations of liability, Professor Magruder asserted,
Quite apart from the question how far peace of mind is a good thing in itself, it would
be quixotic indeed for the law to attempt a general securing of it. Against a large part
of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation
in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection
than the law could ever be.
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in The Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033,
1035 (1936).
6. Keenan & Gillespie, The Insurer and the Tort of the International [sic] Infliction of
Mental Distress: Fletcher v Western National Life Insurance Co., 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 335, 340-
41 (1972).
7. See notes 80-84 and accompanying text infra.
8. The court, in the first instance, determines whether the defendant's conduct may rea-
sonably be regarded as outrageous and whether on the evidence severe mental distress can be
found. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] § 46, Com-
ments h, j (1966). The preliminary decisions increase the judge's ability to mold the scope of
the tort.
9. See note 92 and accompanying text infra.
10. 2 Q.B.D. 57 (1897). Defendant, playing a practical joke on the plaintiff, told her that
her husband was lying at The Elms with both legs broken and she was to go at once to bring
him home. The court, noting that the emotional effect was not too remote to be regarded in
mental anguish ' and declared that a person is responsible for all the
consequences of his intentional and unjustified actions calculated to
infringe a party's legal right to personal safety. 2 The courts in the
United States rejected the Wilkinson holding and refused to recog-
nize an independent tort for the invasion of emotional tranquility.
13
Mental anguish was a parasitic recovery, allowed only if a court
could find a technical tort such as assault,' 4 battery, ' 5 false imprison-
ment,' 6 trespass to land,'7 nuisance,' 8 or invasion of the right of pri-
vacy.' 9 The precedent in the United States changed in 1920 when a
Louisiana court was presented with a situation in which no recog-
nized tort could be found, yet the plaintiff suffered real and substan-
tial damage because of defendant's flagrant and unreasonable
actions. 2° Faced with the dilemma of recognizing a new tort or deny-
ing recovery when denial would offend a civilized system of justice,
the court awarded damages for plaintiff's mental anguish.
The independent tort gained the support of the American Law
Institute in 1948 when it adopted the Restatement of Torts, section
46,2! which provides,
law as a consequence for which defendant was answerable, awarded plaintiff damages for her
mental anguish.
11. Prior to Wilkinson, the courts in England and the United States followed the princi-
ple that, "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when
the unlawful act complained of causes that alone." Lynch v. Knight, I I Eng. Rep. 854, 863
(1861).
12. 2 Q.B.D. 57, 59 (1897). The right to personal safety includes freedom from physical
harm as well as freedom from severe emotional disturbance.
Wilkinson provided the framework for an independent cause of action for the intentional
infliction of mental distress. The following four factors were crucial for granting recovery:
defendant acted intentionally; the act itself was serious; defendant's conduct was unjustified;
and plaintiff was not predisposed to nervous shock.
13. See generally Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), in which
the court upheld the rule that there can be no recovery for mental anguish when there is no
injury to that person from without.
14. See, e.g., Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga. App. 778, 171 S.E. 470 (1933); Holdorfv.
Holdorf, 185 Iowa 838, 169 N.W. 737 (1918); Kurpgeweit v. Kirby, 88 Neb. 72, 129 N.W. 177
(1910); Trogden v. Terry, 172 N.C. 540, 90 S.E. 583 (1916); Leach v. Leach, I I Tex. Civ. App.
699, 33 S.W. 703 (1895).
15. See, e.g., De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881); Williams v. Un-
derhill, 63 App. Div. 223, 71 N.Y.S. 291 (1901); Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527
(1884).
16. See, e.g., Gadsden Gen. Hosp. v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 103 So. 553 (1925); Salis-
bury v. Poulson, 51 Utah 552, 172 P. 315 (1918).
17. See, e.g., American Sec. Co. v. Cook, 49 Ga. App. 723, 176 S.E. 798 (1934); Bouillon
v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 148 Mo. App. 462, 129 S.W. 401 (1910).
18. See, e.g., Shellabarger v. Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566, 91 S.W. 1005 (1905).
19. See Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
20. Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920). Plaintiff, an eccentric old maid,
believed a pot of gold was buried in her back yard. Knowing this belief, defendant buried a
covered pot for the woman to find. When she dug up the pot, plaintiff marched to the city hall
where she was publicly humiliated when the pot was opened.
21. In 1934 the American Law Institute disfavored any recognition of an independent
tort for recovery of mental distress. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934) provided,
Except as stated in §§ 21 to 34 [assault] and § 48 [special liability of carriers for in-
sult], conduct which is intended or which though not so intended is likely to cause
only a mental or emotional disturbance to another does not subject the actor to liabil-
1. One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is sub-
ject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm
results from it, for such bodily harm.
2. Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is
subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes se-
vere emotional distress
a. to a member of such person's immediate family who is
present at the time, whether or not such distress results in
bodily harm, or
b. to any other person who is present at the time, if such
distress results in bodily harm.
The position of the Institute was initially met with judicial op-
position since courts were reluctant to accept the new tort because of
the fear of fraudulent litigation,22 deluge of litigation,23 and unlim-
ited liability.24 The Restatement safeguards against such drastic con-
sequences by imposing the restrictions that actionable conduct must
not only be intentional or reckless, but it also must be extreme and
outrageous. Convinced that these limitations adequately control the
scope of recovery and liability, the majority of jurisdictions has
adopted the independent cause of action for the intentional and out-
rageous infliction of emotional distress.25
III. Elements of IIMD as Applied Against Physicians and
Hospitals
A plaintiff must prove the following four elements of the tort
before recovery will be granted:
a. Emotional distress must be inflicted intentionally or reck-
lessly;
b. defendant's conduct must have been outrageous and ex-
treme;
c. defendant's conduct must inflict severe emotional distress
on plaintiff; and
d. if defendant's conduct was directed at a third party, plaintiff
ity (a) for emotional distress resulting therefrom, or (b) for bodily harm unexpectably
resulting from such disturbance.
The Institute reversed its position in 1948 to recognize the trend in American law to give an
increasing amount of protection to the interest in freedom from emotional harm and adopted
the present RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46.
22. The hypothesis that the courts would be flooded with fraudulent claims "apparently
assumes that juries, confronted by irreconcilable expert medical testimony, will be unable to
distinguish the deceitful from the bona fide." Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 735, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72, 77, 441 P.2d 912, 917 (1968).
23. Fear of a flood of litigation does not justify a rule denying an entire class of claims.
"ITihe existence of a multitude of claims merely shows society's pressing need for legal re-
dress." Id at n.3
24. See Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975); Borst v. Borst, 41
Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New
Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939).
25. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 49-50 (4th ed. 1971).
must share a close relationship with that party, and he must
have been present at the time of such conduct.
26
A. Intentional or Reckless Conduct
In Wilkinson27 the Queen's Bench announced that an individual
is responsible for the direct consequences of his intentional invasion
of another's peace of mind. The American Law Institute, by its
adoption of the Restatement, has recommended that the independent
tort of IIMD be broadened to include reckless28 conduct. This ex-
tension is significant because an individual is responsible not only
for the consequences of his actions that he is certain will follow, but
also for those consequences that in all probability will result, and
that party acts in conscious disregard of the outcome.29
A complaint sounding in outrageous conduct must specify the
intentional or reckless nature of the defendant's actions;3" allegations
of negligence will not suffice. 3 1 Intentional wrongdoing is distin-
guished from negligence by assessing the state of mind of the actor.
The distinction between recklessness and negligence is not as obvi-
ous, however, because the key difference is the quantum or degree of
risk that harm or danger will be inflicted on another person.32 The
quantitative differentiation allows a court wide discretion in deter-
mining whether the IIMD action can be maintained and provides an
opportunity for subtly effectuating a policy of limiting liability
against health care providers. 33 Nevertheless, while the fine distinc-
tion between negligence and recklessness affords a court latitude to
apply a limited liability policy, it also permits a broad application of
IIMD against physicians and hospitals.34
26. Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975). Cf. DeCicco v. Trinidad
Area Health Ass'n, 573 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1977) (implicit incorporation of the elements);
Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971) (implicit incorporation of the elements);
Johnson v. Woman's Hosp., 527 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. 1975) (implicit incorporation of the ele-
ments).
27. See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
28. "Reckless" is defined as,
Not recking; careless, heedless, inattentive, indifferent to consequences. According to
circumstances it may mean desperately heedless, wanton or willful, or it may mean
only careless, inattentive, or negligent.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1435 (4th ed. 1968).
29. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 54 (1956).
30. The intentional or reckless state of mind of the actor goes primarily to the conduct
complained of, with an eye to the certainty or high degree of probability that emotional dis-
tress will follow. Thus, if the conduct was directly aimed at a third party, plaintiff must satisfy
the burden of proof that defendant intentionally or recklessly acted upon the third party.
31. Mere recitation of the legal conclusion that defendant acted intentionally or reck-
lessly will not suffice; plaintiff must also plead facts indicating that defendant's actions sur-
passed negligence. See Muniz v. United Hosp. Medical Center - Presbyterian Hosp., 146 N.J.
Super. 512, 370 A.2d 76 (Law Div. 1976).
32. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 500, Comment g (1966).
33. See note 85 and accompanying text infra.
34. At the present time, most courts refrain from broadening the liability of health care
The intentional or reckless character of the defendant's action is
the first requirement for recovery for IIMD. Once it is determined
that plaintiff has met this burden of proof, the court looks to the
second element of the cause of action; that is, whether defendant's
conduct was outrageous.
B. Outrageous and Extreme
For a cause of action in IIMD to be maintained, defendant's
conduct must be more than intentional or malicious. The action
complained of must have been "so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community."35 The test generally applied is if the facts were recited
to an average member of the community, that person would be
shocked to such a degree that he would exclaim, "Outrageous!"36
The draftsmen of the Restatement proposed several guidelines
for clarifying the nebulous concept "outrageous." First, insults, in-
dignities, threats, annoyances or the like are not so extreme in char-
acter as to come within the meaning of outrageous.37 Second,
conduct may be outrageous in light of a party's knowledge that the
other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress by reason of
some physical or mental condition or other idiosyncracy.38 Third,
outrageous conduct may arise from an abuse of position or relation
with the other, which gives defendant the power to affect the other's
interest.39 These guidelines offer courts limited assistance in discern-
ing the type of conduct that is outrageous.
The few IIMD actions brought against health care providers
shed little light on what actions are considered to be beyond any
tolerable standard of decency. There are but four cases' in which
providers. If this policy shifts to favor the plaintiff, a court may preliminarily classify the
conduct as reckless rather than negligent and apply the elements of IIMD.
35. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 46, Comment d.
36. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1977); State
Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Medlin v. Allied
Inv. Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 398 S.W.2d 270 (1966).
37. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 46, Comment d. This limitation does not apply to
gross insults and indignities inflicted by employees of common carriers, innkeepers, and in
some cases public utilities. Id § 48. See Graham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, 34
So. 91 (1903); Gulf, C & S F. Ry. Co. v. Coopwood, 96 S.W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906);
Prosser, supra note 29, at 59-64.
38. Restatement, supra note 8, at § 46, Comment f. See Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La.
735, 84 So. 37 (1920). The actor's knowledge of the plaintiff's susceptibility to emotional dis-
tress is an implicit factor in determining whether defendant's conduct was intentional or reck-
less because the nature of the conduct includes both state of mind and probability of
consequential emotional harm.
39. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 46, Comment e. See note 61 and accompanying
text infra.
40. DeCicco v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 573 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1977); Rockhill v.
Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971); Johnson v. Woman's Hosp., 527 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn.
1975); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).
courts have held that the physician's or hospital's actions constituted
outrageous conduct within the meaning of the Restatement. The fact
patterns of these cases illustrate the extreme character of the conduct
that is required before recovery for mental anguish is considered.
Oregon was the first jurisdiction to award damages for emo-
tional distress intentionally and outrageously inflicted by a physi-
cian.4 In Rockhill v. Pollard2 the plaintiff, her infant, and her
mother-in-law were injured in an automobile accident and taken for
medical care to the defendant's office where the doctor rudely ad-
dressed the two women.43 Plaintiff, concerned that the child in her
arms was dying, begged the defendant to examine the infant. The
doctor cursorily checked the child and, when the infant vomited, in-
sisted that nothing was wrong with it. Defendant refused to allow
the three people to remain inside until a friend arrived to take them
home and suggested that they wait outside in the sub-zero degree
weather. When the friend arrived, he took the people to the hospital
where the women were treated for lacerations, and the child was di-
agnosed as suffering from severe shock and a skull fracture. No
physical injuries were attributable to the defendant's conduct, but
the plaintiff experienced severe mental anguish as a result of the doc-
tor's conduct. The court, explicitly applying Restatement, section 46,
declared that such conduct was "outrageous in the extreme" 44 and
that the plaintiffs distress was compensable.
In Johnson v. Woman's Hospital5 plaintiff gave birth to a still-
born child and defendant hospital assured plaintiff and her husband
that it would properly dispose of the body. During a checkup at her
doctor's office six weeks later, plaintiff noticed a notation on her
medical chart stating that the body could not be disposed of as a
surgical specimen. The woman did not understand the pathologist
report and consulted her doctor, who suggested that his nurse ac-
company plaintiff to the hospital for an explanation. A hospital
nurse reiterated the statement and escorted plaintiff to a refrigerator
41. The first case that was explicitly and successfully decided on the elements of IIMD as
offered in § 46 of the RESTATEMENT was Rockhil v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971).
In 1959 the court in Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 89 R.I. 195, 151 A.2d 690, did not adopt the
RESTATEMENT, and held that the plaintiff could not recover solely for mental anguish even
though the hospital's actions were intentional.
42. 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971).
43. The defendant looked at the women and said, "My God, woman, what are you doing
out on a night like this?" His attention to their injuries was limited to directing one woman to,
"Get in there and clean yourself up. You are a mess." Id. at 56-58, 485 P.2d at 29-30.
44. The court refrained from applying the test that the conduct must be so extreme that
an average member of the community would exclaim, "Outrageous!", and in lieu of this
adopted a simpler test that the "conduct must be outrageous in the extreme." Id at 60, 485
P.2d at 31. The alteration was proposed to avoid the inconsistent generalities of the "Outra-
geous!" test, which inevitably arise from differing personal definitions of rude, callous or ob-
noxious conduct.
45. 527 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. 1975).
where the nurse removed a jar of formaldehyde in which was float-
ing the discolored and shrivelled body of plaintiff's premature fetus.
The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the action of IIMD against
the hospital, but dismissed that part of the complaint brought against
the doctor and his nurse because it was unforeseeable that the hospi-
tal nurse would subject plaintiff to such reckless and inhumane treat-
ment.46
Grimsby v. Samson4 7 illustrates a more subtle display of outra-
geous conduct than that involved in either Rockhili or Johnson.
Plaintiffs wife, a patient of defendant physician, suffered from a ma-
lignant disease. While the wife was in the hospital, neither the doc-
tor nor the hospital staff took any measures to treat the woman for
her disease or pain. As a result of this abandonment, plaintiff, forced
to watch his wife slowly die in pain and agony, suffered severe
mental anguish.
The Colorado Court of Appeals in DeCicco v. Trinidad Area
Mealth Association" affirmed the trial court award of damages for
outrageous conduct. Plaintiff, on behalf of his wife and himself,
sued the defendant hospital for the wrongful death of his wife and
the intentional infliction of mental distress to him occasioned by the
hospital's refusal to provide ambulance service for his critically ill
wife. The hospital refused to send an ambulance on grounds unre-
lated to the necessity for or availability of service.49 Due to the de-
*nial of service, the wife failed to receive timely medical treatment
and died one hour after arriving at a distant hospital. The appellate
court approved the application of section 46 of the Restatement, and
announced that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish the
elements of outrageous conduct.50
The facts of these cases illustrate that the decisive consideration
is not whether defendant acts or fails to act. Essential to the decision
in Johnson was the overt action of the defendant, whereas liability in
Grimsby and DeCicco was predicated upon passive conduct.5' Fur-
thermore, it is not essential that the conduct be directly aimed at the
plaintiff.52 The Rockhill decision provides the widest latitude for
these criteria: the physician's conduct was overt in that he superfi-
cially examined the infant and openly insulted the women; he acted
46. Id at 141.
47. 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).
48. 573 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1977).
49. Although the wife was employed by the hospital, ambulance service was refused be-
cause her family doctor had recently resigned from the hospital staff. Id at 560-61.
50. Id at 562.
51. See Hirsh, Tort of Outrage in Medical Malpractice, MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 27, 29
(1977 Annual).
52. In Johnson defendant's conduct was directed at plaintiff, whereas the conduct in
Grimsby and DeCicco was aimed at a third party.
passively by ignoring the injuries of the women. The conduct of the
physician was directed at the plaintiff and her child, and the court
did not find it necessary to specify which action justified the plain-
tiff's recovery.53 Viewed in conjunction, the four decisions reveal
that the totality of the circumstances are considered in determining
whether the conduct is so extreme that it surpasses all tolerable
standards of decency.
Implicit within the "bounds of decency. . . in a civilized com-
munity"54 is the concept that outrageousness reflects a deviation
from the conduct expected from a reasonable member of the com-
munity.55 It is the degree of deviation56 from this reasonable stan-
dard that distinguishes rude and abusive conduct from outrageous
conduct,57 and it is within the province of the jury, "subject to the
control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the
conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in lia-
bility." 58
The application of IIMD to encounters outside those involving
health care providers does not clarify the vague term "outrageous."
Although the Restatement is not limited to certain classes of defend-
ants, the tort is most often adopted and applied against collection59
and insurance" agencies. The outrageous nature of the conduct of
such defendants is assessed by the standards of decency, but the fo-
cus lies on the abuse of position, which is the power to affect an-
other's interest. 6 ' This concept of abuse of position has not been
applied to physicians and hospitals, yet the principle logically ex-
53. 259 Or. 54, 60, 485 P.2d 28, 31 (1971).
54. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 46, Comment d.
55. Juxtaposed with the reasonable conduct standard is the reasonable reaction standard.
Conduct is outrageous if the "distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it." Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 397, 89
Cal. Rptr. 78, 90 (1970). This additional requirement of reasonableness coincides with the
viewpoint that trivial emotional distress is not actionable because a toughening of the mental
hide is necessary for contemporary living in a community. See also Wallace v. Shoreham
Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81, 83 (Mun. App. D.C. 1946).
56. The principle of degrees of deviation was utilized by the court in Muniz v. United
Hosp. Medical Center - Presbyterian Hosp., 146 N.J. Super. 512, 370 A.2d 76 (Law Div. 1976).
The plaintiff received a phone call from an employee of defendant hospital, and the unidenti-
fied caller stated that plaintiff's baby was dead. Although the court agreed that the method of
relaying the information was callous, the action itself did not digress from expected conduct
enough to classify it as outrageous.
57. Conduct can be placed on a continuum: the middle point is that standard of behav-
ior expected from a reasonable man; the far right represents ideal conduct; the far left reflects
barbaric behavior. Outrageous conduct lies somewhere on the left side of this continuum, and
the point of outrageousness is a mixed question of law and fact.
58. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 46, Comment h.
59. See, e.g., Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington, D.C., 105 F.2d 62
(D.C. Cir. 1939); Curnutt v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 683, 57 N.W.2d 915 (1953); Duty v. General
Finance Co., 273 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. 1954).
60. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1970); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173 (1967);
Frishett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 Mich. App. 688, 143 N.W.2d 612 (1966).
61. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 46, Comment e.
tends to the medical field. In collection and insurance cases, the
interest is generally monetary,62 but a party is vulnerable to mental
disturbance by reason of interests not related to his economic pos-
ture, such as the safety and health of family members. Physicians
and hospitals are in a position to affect the interests of a patient and
his family because health care providers have control or influence
over the health and recovery of a patient; the degree of authority or
power is not unlike that possessed by insurance or collection agents.
Hence, the outrageousness of the health care provider's conduct
could be appraised in light of the abuse of power, which provides a
more definitive standard than the "bounds of decency."
The application of the tort of outrage against health care pro-
viders is a relatively new concept, and therefore, it is impossible to
delineate types of conduct that meet with judicial standards. The
lack of definitive standards allows a court wide discretion in deter-
mining the bounds of the tort.63 Although outrageousness is a ques-
tion for the trier of fact, "[i]t is for the court to determine, in the first
instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be re-
garded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or
whether it is necessarily so."'  Thus, in reality, the judge determines
the scope of conduct that is actionable under the Restatement.65
C Severe Emotional Distress
There is a split of authority whether recovery should be granted
when the mental distress is unattended by contemporaneous or con-
sequential physical injury.66 The American Law Institute and the
jurisdictions that have adopted the Restatement dispense with the re-
quirement of physical manifestation of distress if the defendant's ac-
tions are directed at the plaintiff or his immediate family. Other
bystanders are not precluded from recovery, but they must prove re-
suiting bodily injury.6 7
In determining severity, courts scrutinize the intensity and dura-
tion of the distress to insure against feigned and trivial claims.68 If
62. See generally Keenan & Gillespie, supra note 6.
63. 62 IowA L. REV. 1141, 1145 (1977).
64. Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 478, 398 S.w.2d 270, 275 (1966).
65. One explanation for the overly strict stance courts take when ruling on whether the
case should be dismissed is that the sympathy of the jury might lie with the plaintiff even
though the defendant's conduct was not extreme and outrageous. This situation is certainly
possible in cases against health care providers for two reasons: compassion naturally arises
upon witnessing another's grief and anguish over loss of or injury to an immediate family
member; and personal identification with the plaintiffs position is not unrealistic because all
persons at some time in their lives will be treated by a physician or hospital staff, or a close
family member will undergo such treatment.
66. II DEPAUL L. REV. 151, 153 (1961).
67. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 46(2)(b).
68. Id, Commentj.
the mental anguish is unaccompanied by physical harm, courts look
for evidence of extreme outrageous conduct.69 This trade-off reflects
an underlying presumption that a person will suffer emotional dis-
turbance from grossly outrageous conduct.7" Indeed, plaintiffs have
had little difficulty establishing this element of the tort of IIMD. The
willingness of courts to protect the interest of mental tranquility
from outrageous interference is apparent from judicial acceptance of
medical evidence of nervousness, loss of sleep and loss of appetite to
substantiate the severity of the distress.7'
D Close Relationship and Presence
It is not difficult to find a causal link between the outrageous
conduct and the emotional harm if the defendant's conduct is di-
rected at the plaintiff. The chain of causation is tenuous, however,
when the plaintiff alleges mental distress from witnessing intentional
and outrageous conduct inflicted on a third party. The Restatement
suggests that the defendant's responsibility should extend to the
plaintiff in third party situations if the plaintiff observes the action
and is a member of the party's immediate family,72 but courts are
reluctant to extend liability beyond close family members.73
The requirement of close relationship and presence carries with
it a degree of foreseeability. When utilized in negligence cases, fore-
seeability of harm to the plaintiff determines the scope of defendant's
duty.74 In IIMD actions, however, the injuries suffered by plaintiff
need not be foreseeable. Rather, the term is implicitly incorporated
in designating the class of plaintiffs who may maintain the cause of
69. Prosser, supra note 29, at 43.
70. Although the arousal of severe emotional disturbance might be unaccompanied by
physical injury, the anxiety results in bodily changes.
Respiration deepens, the heart beats more rapidly, the arterial pressure rises, the
blood is shifted away from the stomach and intestines to the heart and central ner-
vous system and the muscles, the processes in the alimentary canal cease, sugar is
freed from the reserves in the liver, the spleen contracts and discharges its content of
concentrated corpuscles, and adrenlin is secreted from the adrenal medulla.
Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease.- Legal Liabilityfor Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA.
L. REV. 193, 216 (1944) (citing CANNON, WISDOM OF THE BODY (1932)).
The liberal attitude toward evidence of severe mental distress does not comport with the
conservative views regarding the intentional and outrageous nature of the physician's or hospi-
tal employee's conduct. The liberal position does suggest, however, that a judge will not nar-
rowly construe the elements of the tort once he has determined that the plaintiff may maintain
the cause of action.
71. See Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971).
72. The American Law Institute extends this view and submits that liability should be
expanded to include other bystanders who suffer physical manifestations of mental anguish.
The limitation is justified by the practical necessity of limiting the scope of liability and assur-
ing the genuineness of the claim. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 46, Comment 1.
73. Ferrell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Employees Hosp. Ass'n, 336 F. Supp. 833 (W.D.
Va. 1971); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).
74. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968); Mobaldi v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
action.75
To date, the IIMD actions against physicians and hospitals for
outrageous conduct aimed at a third party have been brought by
family members. As the tort develops, courts will inevitably face sit-
uations in which the plaintiff shares a demonstrably close relation-
ship with the third party but is not a member of that party's family.
One can only speculate on the outcome of such a case, but in view of
the liberal trend developing in the area of the negligent infliction of
mental distress, 76 a court would probably find that it is the intimacy
and not the legal relationship between the parties that underlies this
element of the tort.77
IV. Problems with Application
The application of the tort of IIMD to physicians and hospitals
is in the developmental stage-only four states78 have explicitly ap-
plied IIMD to health care providers. The slow evolution of the new
application of IIMD is not directly attributable to the elements of the
tort because the criteria are the same regardless of the status of the
defendant.79 The major obstacles are the judicial policy against
broadening the liability of physicians and hospitals and the failure of
plaintiffs to properly plead the cause of action.
A. Public Policy
In actions against physicians or hospitals, judicial policy ap-
pears to limit liability for the infliction of mental distress to a greater
75. See Graham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1070, 34 So. 91 (1903), in which the
court announced,
The existence of mental suffering by a parent for the loss of a child is a fact so univer-
sal and general that it also may be fairly assumed and recognized as existing in any
given case, in the absence of facts and circumstances tending to disprove the same.
The extent of the distress and sorrow may not be susceptible of direct or exact mea-
surement, but enough certainty and knowledge of the situation can be established
through the introduction of testimony to furnish the basis for a verdict or a judgment.
Id at 1074, 34 So. at 93.
76. See 73 DICK. L. REV. 350 (1969); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100 (1959).
77. The draftsmen of RESTATEMENT § 46 issued the caveat that, "The Institute expresses
no opinion as to whether there may not be other circumstances under which the actor may be
subject to liability for the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress." RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 8, at § 46, Comment 1. This position leaves open the possibility for immedi-
ate family to extend to close associates.
78. Colorado, Oregon, Tennessee and Washington have extended the application of
IIMD to physicians and hospitals. See notes 40-47 and accompanying text supra.
79. The elements of the tort are derived from RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 46 and
the accompanying comments. There is no distinction between the elements applied against
health care providers and those applied against other defendants. Compare Johnson v. Wo-
man's Hosp., 527 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. 1975) with Medlin v. Allied Investment Co., 217 Tenn.
469, 398 S.W.2d 270 (1966). See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d
330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Dotson v. McLaughlin, 216 Kan. 201, 531 P.2d 1 (1975); Rockhill v.
Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291
(1975).
degree than that imposed upon other members of the community. 80
This restrictive approach is understandable only with respect to third
party actions for IIMD because the possibility is great that immedi-
ate family members will be present when health care services are
administered, and thus expose the physician or hospital to extensive
liability.8' The policy is not merely applied in third party cases,
however, but pierces all IIMD actions brought against health care
providers.
B. Preliminary Dismissal
The reluctance to expand the liability of physicians and hospi-
tals is evidenced by the tendency of courts to narrowly construe the
elements of the tort as well as the terms "negligence" and "dam-
ages."82 The strict interpretation of the elements is subtly accom-
plished by applying the judicially imposed standard that the alleged
facts unquestionably denote intentional or reckless conduct. Any
doubt of the state of mind of the defendant or the degree of risk
involved is resolved in favor of the health care provider,83 which re-
sults in a dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. 84 The summary dismissal is based upon
a finding that the alleged conduct constitutes malpractice, which
cannot support an action for IIMD.85
Malpractice, a word of art, is generally equated with negli-
gence,86 yet its application in the field of medicine consists of both
inadvertent and intentional actions.87 Consider the following illus-
trations:
1. Husband and wife are unaware that they are carriers of a he-
80. See Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr.
883 (1973), in which the court announced, "To extend the broadening process to the whole
field of medical malpractice in diagnosis appears to us an unwarranted and impractical expan-
sion." Id at 25, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
81. The likelihood that family members will witness any intentional or reckless and out-
rageous conduct does not justify the policy against broadening the liability of health care prov-
iders. Rather, the possibility of presence supports the argument that liability should extend
beyond the patient because the resulting mental distress is directly attributable to the outra-
geous conduct.
82. See Muniz v. United Hosp. Medical Center - Presbyterian Hosp., 146 N.J. Super.
512, 370 A.2d 76 (Law Div. 1976).
83. See generaly Ferrell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Employees Ass'n, 336 F. Supp. 833
(W.D. Va. 1971); Bulloch County Hosp. Auth. v. Fowler, 124 Ga. App. 242, 183 S.E.2d 586
(1971); Muniz v. United Hosp. Medical Center - Presbyterian Hosp., 146 N.J. Super. 512, 370
A.2d 76 (Law Div. 1976).
84. See Owens v. Children's Memorial Hosp., 480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973); Bishop v.
Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Bessette v. St. Peter's Hosp., 51 A.D.2d 286, 381
N.Y.S.2d 339 (1976); Whetham v. Bismark Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
85. See note 83 supra.
86. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 40 (195 1).
87. See Short v. Downs, 537 P.2d 754 (Colo. App. 1975); Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161,
aff-d, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1905); In re Rosenkrans, 84 N.J. Eq. 232, 94 A. 42 (1915); Los
Alamos Medical Center v. Coe, 58 N.M. 686, 275 P. 2d 175 (1954); Rennewanz v. Dean, 114
Or. 259, 229 P. 372 (1924).
reditary generic disease. Wife becomes pregnant and her doctor
neither conducts a genealogical profile nor tests for the disease in
the fetus. The child inherits the fatal disease and dies two years
after birth. 8
2. A woman gives birth to a baby who dies within several hours
from a fatal hereditary disease. The woman and her husband con-
sult the obstetrician as to the risk, if any, of having another child
afflicted with the same disease. The doctor, knowing the cause of
death of the first-born child, assures the people that the disease is
not hereditary, and in reliance on the doctor's assurances, the wo-
man becomes pregnant. The child is inevitably born with the ge-
netic disease and dies two and one-half years later.89
The first illustration exemplifies inadvertence because the doc-
tor failed to take necessary medical steps to determine whether any
complications in the pregnancy or birth might arise. The second ex-
ample is not a situation involving negligence, but is closely akin to
reckless or intentional conduct. The obstetrician knew that the first-
born child died from a fatal hereditary disease, yet he assured the
parents that they could have a healthy baby. Both illustrations are
based on actual cases, and in each the court found that the doctor's
conduct constituted malpractice.9' These findings demonstrate that
"malpractice" is a catchall term, comprised of both inadvertent and
willful errors.
The distinction between the types of conduct that constitute
"malpractice" and those that do not is significant because it supports
the argument that a dismissal of the case on the ground that the al-
leged facts establish malpractice does not necessarily mean that the
conduct was not intentional or reckless. An action charging a physi-
cian with malpractice should not automatically bar all recovery
under IIMD since plaintiff may be able to prove intentional or reck-
less conduct.9 Courts, however, do not consider this dichotomy
when summarily ruling on preliminary motions, but look only to the
face of the complaint.
Since a complaint phrased in terms of malpractice is deemed to
charge the defendant with negligence, any part of the complaint
seeking damages for mental anguish will either be dismissed for lack
of intent or recklessness, or the merits will be decided under the laws
for the negligent infliction of mental distress. 92 Leave of court to
amend defective pleadings is rarely granted in actions for mental dis-
88. Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976).
89. Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
90. Id at 84, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 113; Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460,
460 (1976).
91. If a plaintiff alleges intentional or reckless conduct, the court will look beyond the
legal conclusion to determine whether the alleged facts support the charge. Since an allegation
of malpractice does not specifically address the nature of the conduct, the court should ex-
amine the facts to resolve whether the defendant acted intentionally, recklessly or negligently,
rather than automatically equating malpractice with negligence.
92. See notes 95-112 and accompanying text infra
tress allegedly inflicted by health care providers. Only two courts93
have explicitly permitted a plaintiff to file such an amended com-
plaint.94 If the court does not dismiss the section of the complaint
seeking recovery for mental distress based on malpractice, and if
amended pleadings are not filed, the plaintiff has but one alternative:
to have the merits tried under the theory of the negligent infliction of
mental distress.
V. A Possible Alternative-Negligent Infliction of Mental
Distress
In an action brought for the negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that defendant breached
a duty owed to the plaintiff and that such breach proximately caused
injury or damage to the plaintiff.95 The element of duty is difficult to
prove in situations in which plaintiff suffers emotional distress from
witnessing defendant's negligent conduct directed at a third person.
To identify and limit the scope of a tortfeasor's duty in third party
cases, courts developed the theory of zones.9 6 The most narrow
viewpoint is that the defendant is liable only to those parties who
were within the "zone of impact."97 An intermediate position, uti-
lized by the majority of jurisdictions,98 is the "zone of danger" rule,
which allows recovery to a bystander who feared for his personal
safety. The most liberal view, established by the California Supreme
Court in Dillon v. Legg,99 is the "zone of fright" rule, which extends
the tortfeasor's duty to bystanders who fear for the safety of the
party directly injured by the tortfeasor's actions.
93. Ferrell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Employees Hosp. Ass'n, 336 F. Supp. 833, 835
(w.D. Va. 1971) (court allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint to allege that defendant's
conduct had been willful and wanton instead of negligent and careless); Park v. Chessin, 60
A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
94. The Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice Arbitration Board has also permitted a plain-
tiff to amend the complaint from negligent to willful and wanton conduct. Gilbert v. Cogan
and Northeastern Hosp. of Phila., No. M77-0004 (Phila., Pa. Arbit. Panel for Health Care
1977).
95. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 30, at 143.
96. See Leibson, supra note 4.
97. Under the zone-of-impact theory "there can be no recovery for the consequences of
fright and shock negligently inflicted in the absence of contemporaneous impact." Whetham
v. Bismark Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1972). The majority of jurisdictions that have
considered whether to adopt or abandon the theory have rejected the requirement of impact.
See Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
98. Comment, Injuries from Fright without Contact, 15 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 331, 337
(1966).
99. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968). The landmark decision startled
other jurisdictions because the court permitted a mother to recover for mental anguish occa-
sioned by her observation of the negligent injury to her daughter, yet the mother was neither
struck by the car nor feared for her own safety. The "zone of fright" rule has been criticized
severely and has achieved little judicial acceptance. See Owens v. Children's Memorial Hosp.,
480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973); White v. Diamond, 390 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md. 1974); Tobin v.
Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969); Whetham v. Bismark
Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).
The theory of zones is inapplicable to actions against physicians
and hospitals for the negligent infliction of mental distress. Underly-
ing both the impact rule and the danger rule is the assumption that a
tortfeasor's scope of duty extends only to those parties who stand in
danger of immediate physical harm. The application of these theo-
ries to the medical field limits potential recovery to the party at
whom the negligent conduct was directed, which is typically the pa-
tient. Responsibility is extended to "bystanders" in limited circum-
stances, such as when the physician fails to detect or warn of the
contagious nature of a patient's disease,l°° when the physician fails
to warn of the patient's propensity for violence,'10 or when the physi-
cian's negligence is directed at an unborn child.'02
Even the liberal jurisdictions that apply the "zone of fright" rule
have refrained from finding a duty running from the health care pro-
vider to the plaintiff in third party cases. The major barrier to recov-
ery stems from the requirement proposed in Dillon that the shock
result "from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sen-
sory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted
with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence."'
' 0 3
Two cases decided by the California courts that follow the Dillon
rationale illustrate this point.
In Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of University of California, '4
plaintiff recovered damages for negligently inflicted mental anguish
suffered when she witnessed the child in her arms become spastic,
convulsant and comatose from an improper solution injected into
the child. Although at the time of the conduct plaintiff was unaware
of defendant's negligent action, she directly and contemporaneously
observed the results of defendant's infliction of harm. °5 Recovery
was denied in Justus v. Atchison, 11 in which plaintiff alleged that his
mental distress was caused by witnessing the negligent delivery of his
100. See Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Fosgate v.
Corona, 66 N.J. 268, 330 A.2d 355 (1974); Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456
(1928).
101. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d
334 (1976).
102. See Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 720 (1976). The health care provider's liability extends also to the child who is deformed
or injured by injury to the mother when she was pregnant. See W. PROSSER, supra note 25,
§ 55, at 335-38.
103. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41,69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (1968).
Sensory perception was originally interpreted by the California courts to require that the
plaintiff understand the tortious event. Hair v. Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr.
639 (1975). This position was overruled one year later in Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976). While the California courts have
clarified the meaning of the phrase, other jurisdictions have not decided the issue. Thus, sen-
sory and contemporaneous observance might be equated with understandable observance in
other states.
104. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
105. Id at 580, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
106. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122 (1977).
child. The court denied relief because plaintiff merely sensed that
something went wrong during the attempted delivery and his anxiety
did not ripen into disabling shock until the doctor informed him of
the death of the fetus."°7 The distinction between the cases is a fine
one;'° 8 in Aoba/di there was no time lag nor distance factor, while in
Justus the plaintiff "had been admitted to the theater, but the drama
was being played on a different stage.""
Under the present state of the law physicians and hospitals are
virtually insulated from liability to bystanders for emotional harm
caused by negligent conduct aimed at a third party. This anamolous
situation occurs because the theory of zones developed from cases in
which the defendant's negligence was brief and sudden."l 0 In con-
trast, the negligence of physicians and hospitals is ordinarily slow
and unraveling."' Consequently, health care providers will con-
tinue to escape responsibility in such cases unless courts define the
scope of duty in terms of the "zone of fright" theory." 2 Even then,
the requirement of "sensory and contemporaneous observation"
should not be interpreted to require full understanding of the medi-
cal blunder because the average layman does not have the profes-
sional background to comprehend the particular nature of the
negligent conduct.
VI. Conclusion
IIMD is an established tort in the United States, but the appli-
cation of the cause of action against physicians and hospitals is a
new concept. The elements of IIMD are the same regardless of the
status of the defendant, yet courts have exhibited reluctance in ap-
plying the tort against health care providers. Though the restrictive
policy is mutable, until a change transpires plaintiffs should be cog-
nizant of the judicial opposition that confronts an IIMD action
against physicians and hospitals.
The narrow application of the Restatement to health care prov-
iders fails to protect individuals against purposeful and atrocious in-
vasions of the interest in emotional tranquility. The policy of strict
107. Id. at 586, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111, 565 P.2d at 136.
108. The court distinguished the cases on the grounds that the plaintiff in Mobaldi ob-
served the injury to the victim, but the negligent action in Justus was hidden from the plain-
tiffs contemporaneous perception. Id at 584, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110, 565 P.2d at 135.
109. Id
110. Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 833
(1973).
111. See Owens v. Children's Memorial Hosp., 480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973).
112. The majority ofjurisdictions in the United States utilizes the "zone of danger" rule in
determining the scope of liability. This rule is not suitable to the health care provider cases
because the negligent action is seldom brief and sudden. One solution to this problem is the
adoption of a bifurcated system, in which the "zone of danger" rule is applied in the brief and
sudden cases, and the "zone of impact" rule is used in the slow and unraveling circumstances.
construction of the elements of IIMD against medical defendants
must be modified so that physicians and hospitals are subject to the
same extent of liability imposed upon other defendants for the inten-
tional or reckless and outrageous infliction of severe emotional dis-
tress.
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